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Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality 
Donald Braman* 
Much of the debate over criminal justice in America derives from the 
fact that many low-income and minority Americans feel neither equal under 
nor protected by our criminal laws.  The effects of underenforcement are 
devastating: Many people living in our nation’s inner cities no longer feel 
safe walking through their own neighborhoods.1  The effects of mass 
incarceration are more devastating still, draining already impoverished 
communities of capital, further straining and often breaking fragile families, 
and stigmatizing not only offenders, their families, and their communities, 
but also hardening racial divides in the process.2 
Repeated attempts to remedy this situation through the courts have, to 
put it mildly, failed.  Expansive readings of the rights of criminal suspects, 
defendants, convicts, and prisoners have not only failed to stem the massive 
institutionalization of those in disadvantaged communities, they have made 
those who litigate to enforce those rights appear to be pro-criminal.3  Worse 
still, as some commentators have noted, these tactics may well interfere with 
communities’ self-policing capabilities.4  The result has been a confused 
movement towards longer sentences out of an indeterminate blend of 
 
 * Assistant Professor, George Washington University School of Law.  I thank Kenworthey 
Bilz, Richard Brooks, Dennis Curtis, Daniel Freed, Nancy Gertner, Dana Goldblatt, Ryan 
Goodman, Derek Jinks, Dan Kahan, and Tracey Meares.  Special thanks to Tahlia Townsend, 
whose ideas and insights run throughout. 
1. See Michael A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks’ Crime Concerns: African Americans Show 
Less Confidence in System, Favor Stiff Penalties, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at A11 (reporting 
that 52% of black Americans are “afraid to walk alone at night” near their own homes). 
2. See generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND 
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (recounting the experiences of the families of prisoners); 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc 
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (presenting a collection of essays arguing against 
America’s current system of “mass imprisonment,” noting that a disproportionate number of 
American criminals are people of color and investigating the social and material impact on the 
families and communities of these criminals). 
3. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 375 (1997) (advising 
progressives to pay as much attention to the interests of those “who must share space on streets and 
in buildings with crack traffickers” as they do to the interests of crack traffickers); Tracey L. Meares 
& Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES 3, 3–4 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers 
eds., 1999) (describing how the building search policy of the Chicago Housing Authority was 
declared unconstitutional over the objections of the community residents whose constitutional rights 
were supposedly being “protected”). 
4.  See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 6–22 (arguing that libertarian conceptions of 
civil rights pursued by the ACLU and enforced by federal judges have disabled community 
anti-crime measures advocated by residents in low-income housing projects). 
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political calculations and warring conceptions of what balance of liberties 
and sanctions will genuinely serve those in disadvantaged communities. 
Equal protection litigation, too, has failed fairly convincingly.  This is 
partly a result of the Supreme Court’s invidious intent standard, which forces 
litigators to go beyond claims that state policies inadvertently contribute to 
the subordination of disadvantaged populations and assert that the state acted 
with discriminatory intent.5  Labeling government actors as racists has 
alienated not only legislators and members of the executive branch, but also, 
increasingly, the general population who view many of the laws as motivated 
by and justifiable in terms of neutral principles.6 
But if the intent-based standard has many failings, the most commonly 
considered alternative—court-mandated remedies derived from an effects-
based standard—has problems that may be equally as serious.  Even if courts 
were willing to undertake broad enforcement in principle, they would remain 
poorly equipped to administer broad effects-based remedies in practice.7 
Perhaps even more importantly, courts are poorly positioned politically 
to manage such broad normative undertakings.  Indeed, where activists have 
pitted the courts against the legislature and the executive branch on sensitive 
social issues—particularly in the criminal law—they have often provoked 
resistance and backlash with harms outweighing the benefit of the initial 
judicial intervention.8 
 
5. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1131–35 (1997) (chronicling the emergence of the 
discriminatory purpose doctrine). 
6. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 375 (explaining how laws enhancing penalties for 
dealing crack that apply to “anyone” caught dealing were misinterpreted as imposing a racially 
discriminatory burden on blacks); Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 4, 16 (explaining how the 
ACLU effectively defeated Chicago laws that gave police the right to conduct mass building 
searches and that prohibited gang loitering despite the fact that many residents wanted these laws to 
protect against gunfire outbursts, fighting, and drug dealing). 
7. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1255 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (citing possible 
institutional boundaries to broad state enforcement of “underenforced federal constitutional 
norms”); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional 
Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 411–12 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Justice] (discussing the possible 
political and legislative ramifications of selectively enforcing certain equal protection principles). 
8. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the 
Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1447–49 (2003) (citing political and legislative 
reform of juvenile courts from institutions that were “nominally rehabilitative social welfare 
agenc[ies]” to “formal legal institutions”); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of 
Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1018–19 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem] (discussing how criminal procedural rules are used to encroach on the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment privacy rights); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy 
Relationship] (asserting that there is an information deficiency among the authors of the criminal 
procedural rules that prevents these rules from properly defining defendants’ rights). 
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In this Article I argue that, to make their vision of justice a reality, 
egalitarians will need to change both their focus and their tactics with respect 
to criminal law.9  The tragedy of contemporary criminal justice is not that 
individual rights are too narrowly construed, but that those living in 
disadvantaged communities are injured both by crime and counter-productive 
law enforcement.  The remedies that egalitarians have historically looked 
to—remedies articulated within the framework of individual rights—are 
poorly suited to address the systematic reproduction of inequality that results. 
First, as a matter of effective politics, egalitarians will need to shift their 
focus from the racially motivated harms directed at individual criminal 
offenders and defendants to the collateral and often unintentional harms 
borne by non-criminals in their communities.10  To give just two examples of 
these harms: (1) the fact that the vast majority of those convicted of drug 
offenses are not required to complete drug treatment programs as part of their 
sentence has devastating effects on the vulnerable families and communities 
to which they return;11 and (2) the fact that fathers who are incarcerated are 
prevented from supporting their children not only harms a broad class of 
non-criminals, but has far-reaching normative effects on family formation 
and father absence, which create serious inter-generational harms.12 
Second, as a matter of pragmatic reform, egalitarians should shift their 
focus from the doctrine of individual liberties to more modest policy reforms 
aimed at increasing the influence that citizens in disadvantaged communities 
exercise over the form of justice itself.13  For too long, these communities 
have been asked to choose between expansive readings of criminal rights or 
oppressively harsh criminal sanctions—either choice making them a party to 
their own subordination. 
 
9.  The principle of antisubordination best captures this deeper conception of justice.  See, e.g., 
Owen Fiss, Another Equality, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF 
ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, 2004, at 3–4, 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=ils (discussing 
antisubordination as it relates to racial antidiscrimination law); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the 
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108–17, 147–70 (1976) (describing the 
“antidiscrimination” and the “group-disadvantaging” principles).  As will become clear, though, I 
disagree with Fiss’s privileging of the judiciary in pursuing this conception of justice. 
10. This would be a return to what Tracey Meares describes as  “public-regarding” concerns in 
criminal procedure.  Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 216 
(2003). 
11. See BRAMAN, supra note 2, at 54–57 (detailing these consequences and reviewing the 
literature). 
12. See id. at 89–96, 154–63 (discussing the effects of incarceration on family structure and 
economic well-being). 
13. Adriaan Lanni has described why juries are particularly promising places to look with 
respect to community empowerment.  See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 394–95 (2005) (discussing how juries can be a useful cross-section 
that adequately displays overall community views on charging, sentencing, and policy-making 
judicial practices). 
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There are, of course, complaints that can be leveled against this strategy.  
It certainly does not offer the sweeping and certain justice that some imagine 
the Constitution guarantees and courts will deliver.14  Perhaps some will see 
it as diminishing the principle of equality under the law to the level of mere 
politics.  But effective reform—reform that is likely to last—requires an 
attention to popular sentiment and social consequence that has eluded 
doctrinal remedies and libertarian principles to date.  It requires both a 
partnership with and the empowerment of those the Court seeks to protect. 
I develop my argument in three parts.  In Part I, I review the co-
evolution of criminal law and equality concerns through the lens of twentieth 
century constitutional doctrine.  Much of the terrain is familiar, but placing 
criminal law and equal protection doctrine side by side produces insights into 
the mismatched objectives and methods of egalitarian reformers of criminal 
law, the results of which are a source of trenchant iniquity today.  In 
particular, I describe how, in the context of rising crime rates and cultural 
conflict, the Warren Court and an increasingly conservative state created 
dysfunctional competition for control over the power of the criminal law to 
harm and protect disadvantaged communities—particularly black 
communities suffering from the legacies of American racial inequality. 
In Part II, I describe the current predicament of the criminal law.  By 
way of example, I show how disparities in crack cocaine sentencing moved 
egalitarians to undertake two unsuccessful and, in retrospect, 
counterproductive strategies.  In the first, egalitarians attempted to use 
constitutional constraints on criminal procedure to increase the costs of 
criminal law enforcement in disadvantaged communities, thereby reducing 
the harms of overincarceration.  In the second, egalitarians made claims of 
hidden or unconscious racism to meet the increasingly obscure doctrinal 
standard of invidious intent.  Both strategies have earned egalitarian litigators 
the scorn of not only conservatives, but also many in the disadvantaged 
communities the litigators are attempting to assist.  Moreover, it has left 
egalitarians with little in the way of a political agenda for addressing the 
subordinating harms of crime and mass incarceration. 
Part III lays out an alternative approach.  There I argue for an approach 
coordinated across the political branches, an approach that seeks to make 
both criminals and the criminal justice system more responsive to the 
practical concerns of the citizenry.  I review empirical data indicating that the 
public is eager for reforms that do both, and I outline a modest reform to 
leverage this popular preference: jury polling.  Jury polling elicits 
information about the popular preferences as a regular part of criminal jury 
trials, forcing greater information about how disadvantaged communities feel 
 
14 Owen Fiss is the most notable advocate of this conception of court-centered justice. See, 
e.g., The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).  
2006] Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality 5 
 
 
about alternative regimes of criminal sanctions.  Jury polling, I argue, would 
systematically (and respectfully) elicit greater information about and draw 
attention to the complex needs of those living in our nation’s most vulnerable 
neighborhoods. 
I. The Second Reconstruction and the Criminal Rights Revolution 
I base my argument on an uncontroversial premise: The same concerns 
about racial inequality that underwrote the Second Reconstruction15 also 
underwrote the criminal rights revolution.16  The crucial difference, however, 
is that unlike the mainstream aspects of the Second Reconstruction—the 
marches, legislation, executive orders, and litigation, which embodied what 
many now describe as “popular” or coordinated constitutionalism—the 
criminal rights revolution was largely court-focused, uncoordinated, and 
unpopular.  In this Part, drawing on existing analyses of the Second 
Reconstruction and the revolution in criminal rights,17 I lay out this claim and 
 
15. I refer to the “Second Reconstruction” rather than the “Warren Court Era” not only because 
my timeline extends beyond the Warren Court, but also because the latter phrase places undue 
weight on the Supreme Court’s role in guiding constitutional politics. 
16. See, e.g., David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New 
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1060 (1999) (“The entire field is of significance 
today only because of a particular historic concern about racial discrimination.”); Yale Kamisar, The 
Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 7 (1995) 
(describing Miranda as an “equal justice” case); Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that 
the criminal rights revolution is “best understood contextually, as a program to counteract the 
distorting influence of institutionalized racism on America’s criminal justice system and, more 
generally, on American democracy”); Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 5 (“The post-
1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system 
was treating black suspects and defendants much worse than white ones.  Warren-era constitutional 
criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980) (characterizing the Fourteenth Amendment “as another 
harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in 
treatment”). 
17. My account of equal protection history draws principally on the work of Robert Post, Reva 
Siegel, and Jack Balkin.  See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE 
ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, 2003, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art11 
(challenging the conventional wisdom that the anticlassification principle triumphed over the 
antisubordination principle and arguing instead that American civil rights jurisprudence vindicates 
both principles); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 446 (2000) (arguing 
that recent Supreme Court decisions “[r]estricting the participation of the representative branches in 
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause” represent a “fundamental break with the forms of interaction 
that the Warren and Burger Courts cultivated with Congress”).  My account of criminal procedure 
draws primarily on the work of Akhil Amar, Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares, and Bill Stuntz.  See 
generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997) (analyzing 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in light of the text, history, and structure of the 
Constitution); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (analyzing the tension between an emerging doctrine of criminal procedure 
based on discretionary law enforcement and the existing constitutional framework that seeks to limit 
such discretion); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
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establish the point of departure for the more controversial claims of Part II 
and the novel proposals of Part III. 
A. The Second Reconstruction and the Hope of Equality 
The last century witnessed the rise and fall of the Second 
Reconstruction.18  The rise—embodied in the freedom marches in 
Birmingham, Selma, Washington, and across the South;19 in escalating 
executive orders for desegregation;20 in the passage of the Civil Rights Acts 
and the Voting Rights Act; in the enforcement of those laws by the Civil 
Rights Division of the Attorney General’s Office; and in court decisions 
leading up to and following in the spirit of Brown v. Board of Education21—
spoke to the American promise of equality and the “withering injustice”22 of 
racial subordination despite that promise.  It was a broad movement with a 
 
393 (1995) (recounting the historical progression of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Stuntz, 
Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8 (arguing that the constitutionalization of criminal procedure has 
substantial unappreciated costs and that constitutional regulation of the criminal justice system 
would be better served by focusing on criminal substance and the funding of defense counsel).  My 
account of the empirical analyses regarding the effects of these reforms draws principally from 
Gerald Rosenberg and Brad Canon.  See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 304–
35 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s criminal rights revolution failed to achieve its goals 
because political support as well as the conditions necessary for change were both lacking); Bradley 
C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels, 5 
AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977) (noting the differential impact between federal and state exclusionary rules 
on illegal searches and seizures). 
18. See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1990, at 3–4 (1982) (describing the Second 
Reconstruction as that period of American history between approximately 1954 and 1968 when 
mass protests spurred executive, legislative, and judicial actions that dismantled much of the formal 
legal apparatus of the Jim Crow system).  For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the somewhat 
broader conception extending into the mid-1990s. 
19. See generally CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING 
TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1996) (describing the intensive community 
organizing that supported the civil rights movement); VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S (Henry Hampton & Steve 
Fayer eds., 1991) (discussing citizens’ descriptions of their participation in freedom marches). 
20. Growing concern about the subordination of blacks in the United States had moved both the 
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations to establish commissions and make executive orders to 
end segregated facilities where possible.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1954–
1958) (ordering military forces to oversee compliance with desegregation standards in various 
school systems); Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943–1948) (ordering desegregation in the 
Armed Forces). 
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The Judiciary had also begun to remove barriers to equality in other 
areas of life by redefining state action and by striking down racially restrictive covenants, Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), voting requirements, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and 
limits on union membership, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
22. Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream, Address to the March on Washington for Jobs and 
Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://
 www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/speeches/address_at_march_on_washington.pdf. 
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deep conception of equality—a justice that extended beyond individual 
concerns to the problems of group conflict and social subordination.23 
The language of Brown certainly speaks to this conception of justice.  
Where the Plessy Court had dismissed the harms of segregation as the fictive 
“construction”24 of overly sensitive blacks, the Brown Court found that same 
harm to be real, deep, and unacceptable.  Even where educational facilities 
were equal in every “tangible” respect,25 the Court reasoned, the harm done 
by school segregation was still unacceptable where it created “a feeling of 
inferiority” that frustrated the education of black children.26 
Brown is often described as an embrace of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.27  
In some respects, this may misapprehend the way those engaged in the First 
 
23. See Alan F. Westin, The Supreme Court and Group Conflict: Thoughts on Seeing Burke Put 
Through the Mill, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 665, 674 (1958) (arguing that this broad movement was an 
appropriate response to a new and “contemporary” understanding of equal protection under the 
law).  This was one of the main concerns that conservatives had with Brown at the time.  See, e.g., 
Albert A. Mavrinac, From Lochner to Brown v. Topeka: The Court and Conflicting Concepts of the 
Political Process, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV.  641, 642–43 (1958) (asserting that the Court had 
abandoned the individualist conception of justice embodied in Lochner for a group-based 
conception in Brown). 
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races 
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”). 
25. There were, of course material disadvantages that blacks in the dual school system faced.  
Black schools, on average, had lower quality facilities, fewer teachers, larger class sizes, older 
books, and other material disadvantages.  See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1950) 
(“The University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was excluded, was staffed by a 
faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of whom are nationally recognized 
authorities in their field.  Its student body numbered 850.  The library contained over 65,000 
volumes.  Among the other facilities available to the students were a law review, moot court 
facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation.  The school’s alumni occupy the most 
distinguished positions in the private practice of the law and in the public life of the State.  It may 
properly be considered one of the nation’s ranking law schools.  [In contrast,] [t]he law school for 
Negroes which was to have opened in February, 1947, would have had no independent faculty or 
library.  The teaching was to be carried on by four members of the University of Texas Law School 
faculty, who were to maintain their offices at the University of Texas while teaching at both 
institutions.  Few of the 10,000 volumes ordered for the library had arrived; nor was there any full-
time librarian.  The school lacked accreditation.”).  But these arguably could have been remedied 
without integration. 
26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.  This links Brown with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
308 (1879), in which the Court suggested that the exclusion of blacks from juries was “practically a 
brand upon them . . . an assertion of their inferiority.” 
27. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29–30 
(1999) (opining that Harlan’s dissent in Plessy became famous because it was vindicated by 
Brown); Paul Finkleman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 973, 996 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)) (noting that Justice Harlan’s 
dissents “pave[d] the way” for Brown); Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment 
Equal Protection Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 251 
(2000) (using Brown as an example of an instance when Chief Justice Warren chose not to cite 
important dissents in controversial opinions, because “despite the fact that Brown essentially 
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Reconstruction understood their struggle for equality under the law.28  But in 
at least one respect it does seem right.  The Brown Court was doing more 
than objecting to segregation for segregation’s sake; it was attempting to 
make good on Harlan’s claim that “there is in this country no superior, 
dominant, ruling class of citizens,” that, as he put it, “[t]here is no caste 
here.”29  In Brown, the American racial caste system had reached what many 
hoped would be the beginning of its end. 
But the Brown Court was not alone in its fight against racial 
stratification in civil and private life; in fact the Court was both responding to 
and encouraging the activism of the public, the Legislature, and, perhaps 
most directly, the Executive Branch.30 
President Truman had spoken forcefully on the issue of racial 
discrimination,31 and it was under Truman that Attorney General McGranery 
asked the Court to discard segregation once and for all “as a negation of 
rights secured by the Constitution.”32  Responding to public demand and the 
unanimous Brown decision, when the Governor of Arkansas used the 
National Guard to bar black students from attending Little Rock Central High 
School in 1957, the NAACP obtained an order barring the use of the Guard 
for that purpose, and President Eisenhower immediately sent the 101st 
Airborne to protect the black students as they attended their new school.33  In 
1960, when segregationists threatened the six-year-old Ruby Bridges for 
planning to attend a formerly all-white school in New Orleans, President 
Eisenhower again responded, this time sending federal marshals as escorts.34 
Congress also played an active role in the Second Reconstruction.  
Under intense pressure from an increasingly active public and a determined 
President Johnson, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 which 
prohibited discrimination in employment, established the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, and banned discrimination in public 
 
vindicated and adopted Harlan’s position,” Warren did not cite Harlan’s dissent in Plessy anywhere 
in the Brown opinion). 
28. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1121 (noting the distinction between “civil” and “social” rights 
at the time of the Plessy decision). 
29. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. 
30. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
31. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8) (quoting from President Truman’s addresses to Congress), 
available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu/pdf/347-483/022.pdf. 
32. Id. at 25. 
33. Sadly, they were not fully protected.  The “Little Rock Nine,” as they were known, were 
beaten, spat on, and cursed at throughout their attendance.  See JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE 
PRIZE 92–119 (1987).  Melba Patillo Beals, a member of the “Nine” was beaten, stabbed, and had 
acid thrown in her eyes.  See MELBA PATILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON’T CRY 173–74 (1995). 
34. See Joel Wm. Friedman, Desegregating the South: John Minor Wisdom’s Role in Enforcing 
Brown’s Mandate, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2207, 2224–25 (2004) (relating Ruby Bridge’s predicament). 
35. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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accommodations connected with interstate commerce.36  That act and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968,37 which extended these guarantees to housing and 
real estate, did not aim to remove race from the language of the law; they 
described practical efforts that could be made in furtherance of a society in 
which the law no longer contributed to racial injustice.  The Voting Rights 
Act of 196538 was another part of this broad attack on legal and political 
maintenance of inequality.39 
Ordinary citizens, too, were active reconstructors.  Across the country, 
they took to the streets and the voting booths in increasingly large numbers 
and pushed for the elimination not only of segregation but of the more subtle 
forms of discrimination that sustained racial inequality.  In bus boycotts, 
freedom rides, lunch counter sit-ins, and perhaps most famously, the marches 
on Birmingham, Washington, and Selma, Americans demanded a deep and 
abiding justice that included the unmet promise of true equality of 
opportunity.  When private citizen Martin Luther King Jr. declared, “No, no, 
we are not satisfied and we will not be satisfied until ‘justice rolls down like 
waters and righteousness like a mighty stream,’”40 he not only voiced his 
opposition to segregation but also described the greater aspiration and 
demand of the movement—true equality in the economic, political, and 
social life of the nation. 
Throughout the 1960s—under pressure from the public, the Executive 
Branch, and Congress—the Court extended its holding in Brown to other 
areas of segregation.41  And, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,42 
 
36. President Kennedy, in proposing the Act, gave voice to the broad principle it embodied, 
declaring that “[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races 
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial 
discrimination.”  H.R. DOC. NO. 124, at 12 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1526, 1534. 
37. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73. 
38. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
39. President Johnson, speaking to Congress in advance of their vote on the Act, made the case 
in terms of what he described as a “constitutional promise”: 
Our mission is at once the oldest and the most basic of this country: to right wrong, to 
do justice, to serve man. . . . Experience has clearly shown that the existing process of 
law cannot overcome systematic and ingenious discrimination. . . .  In such a case our 
duty must be clear to all of us.  The Constitution says that no person shall be kept from 
voting because of his race or his color.  We have all sworn an oath before God to 
support and to defend that Constitution.  We must now act in obedience to that oath. 
Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, 65 PUB. PAPERS 281, 281–83 (Mar. 15, 
1965).  President Johnson was reminding Congress that the Constitution was not the purview of the 
courts alone.  While seeing the promise of equality as a constitutional promise, Johnson recognized 
that the obligation to defend and uphold the Constitution extended to all Americans. 
40. King, supra note 22 (quoting Amos 5:24). 
41. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (holding that police 
enforcement of a local custom requiring the separation of races in eating establishments violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee to equal protection). 
42. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach,43 and Oregon v. Mitchell,44 the Court upheld 
various aspects of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.  And finally, in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education45 and Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.,46 the Court extinguished any ambiguity about the scope of the 
Second Reconstruction’s aspirations, holding that the appearance of 
neutrality was not enough and that race-based remedies, where necessary, 
were required.47 
B. Equality and the Criminal Rights Revolution 
The Court’s sweeping reform of the criminal justice system—and the 
Court’s reforms are indeed sweeping48—were related, if not integral, to the 
Second Reconstruction.  Robert Cover mapped the early stages of the Court’s 
pursuit of equality through criminal procedure,49 describing the extension of 
Fourteenth Amendment concerns into the heartland of criminal procedure in 
cases like Moore v. Dempsey,50 Powell v. Alabama,51 and Brown v. 
 
43. 383 U.S. 301, 327–28 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
44. 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (upholding the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act). 
45. See 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1971) (holding that a district court equitable order was 
constitutional where it included the use of mathematical ratios of racial composition as a guide for 
desegregation efforts, majority-to-minority transfer and transportation provisions, alteration of 
school attendance zones on the basis of race, and mandatory busing of minorities). 
46. See 401 U.S. 424, 429–36 (1971) (explaining that Title VII requires more than neutrality 
with respect to employment requirements when they “‘freeze’ the status quo” and “invidiously 
discriminate on the basis of racial . . . classification,” and that employers bear the burden of 
showing that such requirements are tied to job performance). 
47. In Swann, the Court noted that simply removing racial categories from the law did not reach 
the intent of Brown, finding that “an assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to 
be neutral,” Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, and that “[a]wareness of the racial composition of the whole 
school system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy.”  Id. at 25.  The Court also 
held that otherwise legitimate material concerns were not compelling enough to allow a district to 
avoid integration.  Id. at 23–31.  The “district judge or school authorities,” the Court wrote, “should 
make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation.”  Id. at 26 
(emphasis added).  The holding of the Court was clear: the Constitution “warrants a presumption 
against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition.”  Id.  The Swann 
Court thus not only required state actors to carefully attend to race, but when school administrators 
failed to include sufficiently representative numbers of black students in their schools, the Court 
found that the Constitution placed an affirmative burden on them to justify their failure to do so.  Id. 
at 22–27.  In Griggs, the Court held that even when supported by a legitimate business practice, 
Title VII prohibited any practices that disqualified a disproportionate number of blacks not justified 
by a “business necessity,” 401 U.S. at 431, including practices that were “neutral on their face, and 
even neutral in terms of intent.”  Id. at 430. 
48. See supra note 16. 
49. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 
YALE L.J. 1287, 1305–09 (1982). 
50. 261 U.S. 86, 87–92 (1923) (overturning a mob-dominated conviction on due process 
grounds). 
51. 287 U.S. 45, 65–73 (1932) (discussing how the federal constitutional right to counsel 
applies to states in some circumstances). 
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Mississippi.52  It was in these cases that the federal oversight of criminal 
procedure became closely associated with restraining racial hierarchy. 
But it was during the 1960s and ‘70s that the Court was most active.  
Operating under “the assumption that communities could not be trusted to 
police their own police because of the distorting influence of racism,”53 the 
Court “erected a dense network of rules to delimit the permissible bounds of 
discretionary law-enforcement authority.”54  Mapp v. Ohio55 expanded the 
Court’s understanding of criminal suspects’ and criminal defendants’ rights, 
an understanding that was soon further expanded by Gideon v. Wainwright56 
and Miranda v. Arizona.57  Juvenile criminal defendants were also granted 
greater constitutional standing under In re Gault.58 
Perhaps the most dramatic expansion of federal judicial power into the 
criminal justice system occurred in the Court’s prison cases.  Federal 
involvement in the quality of incarceration was most dramatically expanded 
in 1964 when the Supreme Court read the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as 
granting inmates the right to bring legal action against prison officials in 
Cooper v. Pate.59 
Since Cooper, prisoners and their advocates have, through the courts, 
successfully reduced restrictions on inmates providing one another with legal 
assistance,60 increased prisoner’s access to mail,61 required that 
administrators provide equal opportunity for inmates to pursue minority 
faiths,62 gained inmates standing to sue for unnecessary punishment,63 
 
52. 297 U.S. 278, 286–87 (1936) (requiring, via the Fourteenth Amendment, exclusion of 
coerced confessions by states).  The defendant had been whipped, but, in the words of the deputy 
sheriff, “‘[n]ot too much for a negro.’” Id. at 284. 
53. Kahan & Meares, supra note 17, at 1153. 
54. Id. 
55. 367 U.S. 643, 654–60 (1961) (discussing the application of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the states with respect to the “exclusionary rule” and the right to privacy). 
56. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (guaranteeing the right to assistance of counsel). 
57. 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (providing procedural safeguards for the privilege against self-
incrimination). 
58. 387 U.S. 1, 25–31 (1967) (holding that juvenile delinquency proceedings that may lead to 
commitment must satisfy the requirements of due process and fair treatment). 
59. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1979 of the Revised 
Statutes provided a prisoner with a cause of action to sue the warden); James B. Jacobs, The 
Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND 
IMPRISONMENT 33, 36–37 (James B. Jacobs ed., 1983). 
60. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (“[U]nless and until the State provides some 
reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it 
may not validly enforce a regulation . . . barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other 
prisoners.”). 
61. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417 (1974) (holding that “the decision to censor or 
withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards”). 
62. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the prison officials’ 
refusal to allow Buddhist religious services was a violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
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increased inmate access to medical care,64 subjected severe forms of isolation 
to heightened levels of constitutional scrutiny,65 and even found entire state 
prison systems unconstitutional.66  Over the course of two decades, the 
number of cases brought by prisoners went from a dozen to hundreds to tens 
of thousands.67 
The motivation behind reforms in criminal procedure and prisoners’ 
rights were unquestionably linked with equality-seeking reforms in laws 
governing education, the workplace, and voting rights.68  As the arrests of 
civil rights protestors across the South indicated, the police power of the state 
was a considerable tool for advancing the interests of the white men who 
held positions of power and openly sought the subordination of black 
Americans.  States, as many egalitarians realized, could not be trusted with 
the protection of minority citizens.  The tenor of court rulings, as a result, 
began emphasizing contemporary considerations of the “broad and idealistic 
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”69 
But the criminal rights reforms of this period were also different from 
broader civil rights reforms in important ways.  While the court reforms of 
criminal rights were reluctantly tolerated by the executive and legislative 
branches in some states, in most they were openly opposed.  More 
importantly, they were neither demanded nor supported by the public at 
large.  Indeed, many complained that civil rights activists were employing 
the courts to restrict state police powers not in service of innocents in the 
community, but in service of criminal rights and in the teeth of public 
opposition.70 
 
63. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (overturning dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s 
complaint against prison officials). 
64. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (maintaining that “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (citation omitted). 
65. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (“Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell 
is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”). 
66. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
67. By the late 1970s, at the request of the federal Judiciary and other federal officials, most 
state prisons were prodded to implement some formal mechanism to address inmate complaints 
outside of the courts.  See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., REPORT ON THE GRIEVANCE 
MECHANISMS IN STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND LARGE-CITY JAILS app. I, at 1–4 
(1977) (discussing essential features of grievance mechanisms and reporting on the number of states 
that used mechanisms and on the various types of mechanisms used); Donald P. Lay, Corrections 
and the Courts: A Plea for Understanding and Implementation, 1 RESOL. CORRECTIONAL PROBS. 
& ISSUES 1, 10 (1974) (advocating the creation of an administrative grievance adjustment policy 
within the prison system to lighten court dockets swollen by prisoner complaints). 
68. See supra notes 15–17. 
69. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (citations omitted). 
70. See Kamisar, supra note 16, at 44 (“It is hard to think of a single significant ruling against 
the police by any Supreme Court that has not evoked strong criticism.”).  Gideon is an interesting 
exception to this sentiment.  See id. at 43 (describing Gideon as “the only Warren Court criminal 
procedure decision in favor of the defense that was greeted by widespread applause”).  Public 
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C. The War on Crime and the Retreat from Anti-Subordination 
Soaring crime rates throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s and Robert F. Kennedy’s assassinations, and Johnson’s withdrawal 
from the presidential ticket threw the left into disarray.  Republicans in the 
1968 election ran their campaigns largely against the expansion of rights for 
criminal suspects, defendants, and convicts.  Americans, they argued, wanted 
“an end to government that acts out of a spirit of neutrality or beneficence or 
indulgence towards criminals.”71 In particular, the courts that had 
“approve[d] and often underwrit[ten] the very things our individual integrity 
rejects”72 needed to be reigned in.  Nixon’s call for a “militant crusade 
against crime”73 was the centerpiece of his campaign and the issue that 
distinguished him most sharply from Humphrey and to which Humphrey 
tried vainly to respond.  Nixon repeatedly returned to the changes in criminal 
procedure, complaining that the criminal justice system, undermined by the 
Warren Court and the Johnson administration, had “crumbled before the 
rising tide of crime.”74 
Republican candidates explicitly linked the battle against crime with 
their understanding of equality.  The presidential candidate and Governor of 
California, Ronald Reagan, reframed the Supreme Court’s expanded 
 
support for the principle behind Gideon notwithstanding, the Court has very nearly gutted that as 
well, a move that has provoked little protest.  See generally William S. Geimer, A Decade of 
Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington has undermined the right to counsel).  The lack of protest for a once popular principle 
can be read as further evidence that the public has been alienated by the other progressive reforms in 
criminal procedure doctrine. 
 Evidence drawn from recent experimental studies suggest that my reading of public opinion—
supportive of anti-racist interventions, but adamantly opposed to broad libertarian readings—
remains correct.  In a study in which participants were exposed either to a racist search or just a 
search that clearly violated current Fourth Amendment doctrinal requirements but was not 
motivated by racism, participants consistently supported exclusion in the former case and objected 
to exclusion in the latter.  Kenworthey Bilz, Values or Consequences?  The Psychology of the 
Exclusionary Rule (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  When asked why, participants 
stated that the racist search “contaminated” not only the evidence, but the entire criminal justice 
system, the integrity of which they wanted to protect.  Id.  But a non-racist search that violated the 
Fourth Amendment principles didn’t contaminate the evidence, and participants refused to exclude 
the evidence in order to punish the police.  Id.  In the words of Kenworthey Bilz, the investigator, 
the difference derives from the “cherished American value” of equal protection under the law: “This 
value dictates that so long as we are doing nothing to provoke suspicion, we should all be equally 
likely to have to undergo a search by the police.  When evidence is instead discovered as the 
product of a benevolently motivated search (say, good-hearted zealousness to catch crooks), no taint 
occurs.”  Id. 
71. John W. Finney, Nixon and Reagan Ask War on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1968, at 1 
(printing excerpts from Richard M. Nixon’s statements on crime and violence made to the 
Republican Party’s Committee on Resolutions). 
72. G.O.P. Testimony on Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1968, at 20 (quoting Reagan). 
73. Id. (quoting Nixon). 
74. Id. (quoting Nixon). 
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interpretation of the constitutional rights of suspects, defendants, and 
convicted criminals as related to a misapprehension of how best to do justice 
to the disadvantaged: 
It is time to restore the American precept that each individual is 
accountable for his actions . . . .  We need a new recognition in this 
country—that a mugging in the ghetto is as serious a crime as a 
mugging on Main Street.  There can be no color line between black 
murderer and white murderer, between black safety and white safety.  
We need not only equal enforcement of the law—but also equal 
protection of the law.75 
Nixon echoed Reagan’s equal protection analogies in his own campaign on 
law and order: “We must return to a single standard of justice for all 
Americans, and justice must be made blind again to race and color and creed 
and position along an economic or social line.”76 
Nixon’s election and subsequent appointment of four Supreme Court 
Justices in the space of three years effectively removed the support of the 
Executive and Judicial Branches from the movement towards a more 
thorough investigation into the social roots of inequality and the concern for 
the potentially subordinating effects of facially neutral policies.77  In 
Washington v. Davis,78 the transformed Court began what would become a 
nearly unbroken three-decade retreat from the aspects of Brown that looked 
to effects. 
Just as many early criminal procedure cases can be read as equal 
protection cases, Washington v. Davis, although ostensibly an equal 
protection case, can also be read as reaching the heart of criminal procedure.  
In Davis, the plaintiffs challenged a race-neutral testing program for the 
District of Columbia police force that failed significantly more blacks than 
whites.79  In rejecting their challenge, the Court stated that the fundamental 
principle of equal protection is “that the invidious quality of a law claimed to 
be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially 
discriminatory purpose.”80 In subsequent cases, the Court not only repeatedly 
 
75. Id. (quoting Reagan). 
76. Id. (quoting Nixon). 
77. Cass Sunstein goes further, arguing that Nixon’s appointees prevented the adoption of 
principles consistent with Franklin Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights.  See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE 
SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN 
EVER 108 (2004) (“President Nixon appointed four justices who promptly reversed the emerging 
trend, insisting that the Constitution does not include social and economic guarantees.”). 
78. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
79. Id. at 232–33. 
80. Id. at 240. 
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reaffirmed this holding, but steadily distinguished and limited the holdings of 
the Brown Court.81 
In the face of Supreme Court decisions that increasingly restricted and 
eroded Brown, Griggs, and Swann, Congress responded with a series of 
legislative acts protesting this retreat.82  But in the field of criminal 
procedure, rather than resistance, there were cheers of support from the 
legislature, the administration, and the public at large as the Court made short 
order of its previously expansive readings of criminal rights.83  As Yale 
Kamisar noted in a retrospective on the revolution in criminal rights: 
The last years of the Warren Court constituted a period of social 
upheaval marked by urban riots, disorders on college campuses, ever-
soaring crime statistics, ever-spreading fears of the breakdown of 
public order, and assassinations and near-assassinations of public 
figures.  Moreover, the strong criticism of the Court by many 
members of Congress and by presidential candidate Richard Nixon 
and the obviously retaliatory provisions of the Omnibus Crime 
 
81. But see Balkin & Siegel, supra note 17, at 3–4 (arguing that Brown could be read to support 
both anticlassification and antisubordination principles and that the Court has repeatedly upheld 
anticlassification as guided by antisubordination in subsequent cases). 
82. When the Court, in the 1976 case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 
(1976), held that excluding disabilities related to pregnancy from a health insurance plan did not 
constitute sex-based discrimination under Title VII, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, which amended Title VII to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy, reinstating the EEOC’s interpretation of the law.  Compare Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to include 
decisions based on pregnancy or childbirth within the meaning of prohibited sex-based 
discrimination in employment), with Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140–41 (considering an EEOC guideline 
categorizing pregnancy-related conditions as valid “temporary disabilities” for the purpose of 
benefits).  When the Court, in the 1980 case of City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980), 
held that the plaintiffs had to prove changes in voting practices that harmed minorities were 
motivated by discriminatory intent, Congress responded by amending the Voting Rights Act in 
1982, effectively reestablishing the disparate impact standard established in White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755 (1973).  Compare Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 
Stat. 131, 134 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973b to bar racially discriminatory vote dilution based on a 
“totality of circumstances”), with Regester, 412 U.S. at 769–70 (holding that racially discriminatory 
vote dilution may be established based on electoral structure and social and historical factors).  And 
when the Court, in the 1989 case of Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989), 
held that employers could justify hiring practices with disparate impacts if they served “legitimate 
employment goals of the employer,” Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, effectively 
reinstating the Court’s earlier holding in Griggs.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§ 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to restore the standard in Griggs and 
denouncing the standard in Ward’s Cove).  See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
430 (1971) (ruling that “practices, procedures, or tests . . . even [if] neutral in terms of intent, cannot 
be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices”). 
83. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court explicitly walked away from the notion that 
equality might be achieved through criminal procedure, describing and then rejecting the argument: 
“The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, 
particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence 
from any criminal trial.”  Id. at 14–15. 
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Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 contributed further to an 
atmosphere that was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the 
Warren Court’s mission in criminal cases.84 
Indeed, conservatives continued to use public disapproval of the revolution in 
criminal rights to gain further political advantage over the next two 
decades.85 
The success of Bill Clinton’s bid for the Presidency on the Democratic 
ticket in 1992 was similarly contingent on his distinguishing criminal 
offenders from the disadvantaged.  Clinton, a former state prosecutor, self-
consciously adopted a law-and-order stance more doggedly pro-law 
enforcement than his Republican opponent, moving the party away from its 
traditional alignment with Warren Court innovations and into what has now 
become a staple position of the modern Democratic Party.86  With 
Republicans in the majority in the House and Senate for the first time since 
Brown, the last leg of the Second Reconstruction’s support for the criminal 
rights revolution had given way. 
In the wake of the Republican Revolution, the principle of color-blind 
equality has all but eclipsed the Court’s broader attacks on racial 
subordination.87  The Court openly rejects pursuit of equality considerations 
through criminal doctrine,88 and the meaning of race is, tragically, defined 
primarily by the vastly disproportionate number of black men in the criminal 
justice system and their broken families in the community. 
Even some of the staunchest supporters of judicial intervention now 
look back in anguish, acknowledging that the “constitutionalization of the 
process . . . may have contributed to an increased willingness to rely on 
 
84. Kamisar, supra note 16, at 3. 
85. See Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1337, 1338–39 (2002) (ascribing the Republican successes after 1968 to their adoption of the “law 
and order” issue). 
86. See, e.g., THE 2000 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM: PROSPERITY, PROGRESS, AND 
PEACE 23 (2000), available at http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2000platform.pdf (“Bill Clinton and 
Al Gore took office determined to turn the tide in the battle against crime, drugs, and disorder in our 
communities.  They put in place a tougher more comprehensive strategy than anything tried before, 
a strategy to fight crime on every single front: more police on the streets to thicken the thin blue line 
between order and disorder, tougher punishments—including the death penalty—for those that dare 
to terrorize the innocent . . . .”). 
87. But see Balkin & Siegel, supra note 17, at 4 (tracing the influence of antisubordination 
principles within the Court’s facially anticlassification jurisprudence). 
88. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996), for example, explicitly drives a wedge between procedure and the Court’s equal protection 
doctrine, insisting that precedent had long “foreclose[d] any argument that the constitutional 
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers.”  Id. at 
813.  Continuing, Scalia wrote: “We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits 
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.  But the constitutional basis 
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not 
the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. 
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prisons and even to the increasing oppressiveness that results from the 
development of supermaximum institutions.”89 And some of the fiercest 
prison litigators concede that “by promoting the comforting idea of the 
‘lawful prison,’ the litigation movement may have smoothed the way for 
ever-harsher sentences and criminal policies.”90 
Today there is little popular support for expanding the rights of criminal 
suspects, defendants, or prisoners.  And the vast majority of Americans—
including black Americans—still feel, as they have for as long as we have 
records of popular opinion, that courts impose sentences that impose serious 
burdens on the community and do not demand enough from prisoners.91  The 
questions we face today are less questions of overt racial discrimination in 
the criminal justice process than of how to control the effects of our ever-
expanding prison populations—prisons not filled with political protestors, 
but with those who commit assaults, rapes, murders, and, most commonly, 
drug crimes in the inner city.   
Egalitarians lack a clear agenda.  We understand that the harms 
generated by the criminal justice system are largely borne by racial 
minorities, but we have also come to realize that criminals impose serious 
harms on the same disadvantaged communities we hope to protect. 
II. The Egalitarian Response to Mass-Incarceration 
Our criminal justice system keeps the idea of race alive and significant 
today.  By reinforcing the conditions that racial stereotypes presume, the 
criminal justice system has become one of the most race-generative 
institutions in our society.  Indeed, while it remains true that many young 
black men are incarcerated in part because they are black, it may be equally 
accurate to say that today they are black because they are incarcerated.92 
 
89. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 375 (1998). 
90. Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1998 n.19 (1999). 
91. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS—1999, at 130–31 tbl.2.56 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2000) 
(demonstrating that in 1998, 74% of people surveyed stated that courts did not deal “harshly 
enough” with criminals).  The evidence of a general perception of the lack of sufficient punishment 
is not limited to statistical studies.  See, e.g., Jean Johnson, Prisoners Have It Easy, THE HERALD-
SUN, Apr. 20, 1995, at A12 (“As a working, taxpaying citizen, I am shocked. [We’re] buying 12 32-
inch TVs for prisoners in the new jail.  I work every day, live in a 45-year-old house and have a 19-
inch TV.  It is inhuman for prisoners to be made to pick up litter.  I work and help pick up litter on 
the weekends—give the citizens a break.  I suppose we will all have to rob banks, shoot our 
neighbors or break into someone’s home.  Then the county government can support us, too.”); Peter 
T. Kilborn, Revival of Chain Gangs Takes a Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at A18 
(“Rehabilitation does not work, say people in Centreville.  And prisoners have it too easy, they add.  
A convict gets free room, board, medical care and television, while they have to earn both their own 
keep and his.  They want convicts, like welfare recipients, to work.”). 
92. See BRAMAN, supra note 2, at 186–87 (“The very problems that incarceration 
exacerbates—from diminished income to undesired single parenting [to steadily diminishing 
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In our nation’s capital, for example, approximately 1 out of every 20 
adult black men is in prison, and, as of the last estimate, 49.9% of the black 
men between the ages of 18 and 35 were under some form of correctional 
supervision.93  If this situation persists, more than 75% of young black men 
in the District and more than 90% of those in the poorest neighborhoods can 
expect to be incarcerated at some point in their lives.94  A few decades ago, 
in any city these statistics would have been astounding.  Today, compared 
with other cities, these are commonplace.95  At a cost of over $40 billion a 
year, the United States now holds 1 out of every 4 of the world’s 
prisoners96—prisoners who in our country, as everyone knows, tend to be 
black and brown young men in disadvantaged communities.  This is a 
travesty; unfortunately, egalitarian reformers—particularly legal theorists and 
activists—are working with tools poorly suited to their objective. 
A. An Illustrative Example of the Problem: Crack Cocaine Sentencing 
To understand the complexity of the problem and the failure of 
traditional egalitarian strategies for resolving it, take the example of recent 
and highly unproductive debates over the disparities between crack and 
powder cocaine sentencing. 
The evidence that egalitarians have marshaled in their critique of the 
disparities is troubling indeed.  Under federal law, for example, while simple 
possession of any quantity of powder cocaine by first-time offenders is 
considered a misdemeanor, punishable by no more than 1 year in prison, 
simple possession of crack cocaine is a felony, carrying a 5 year mandatory 
sentence.97  Then there is the oft-noted 100:1 ratio for dealers: Defendants 
convicted of selling 500 grams of powder cocaine or 5 grams of crack 
cocaine both receive 5 year sentences; for 5 kilos of powder cocaine and 50 
grams of crack, the penalty is 10 years.98  All of which would seem rather 
 
deterrence]—are deeply embedded in stereotypes of black families in America.  These racially 
constitutive aspects of our criminal sanctions, the extent to which our criminal justice system 
continues to create the social construct of race and to reinforce our understanding of it, are linked to 
the stigmatization of black Americans in general.”).  This essentially reverses standard theories of 
the “racial construction of crime.”  See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race & Reproduction, 67 
TULSA L. REV. 1945, 1954–61 (1993). 
93. Eric Lotke, Nat’l Ctr. on Insts. & Alternatives, Hobbling a Generation: Young African 
American Men in D.C.’s Criminal Justice System Five Years Later (Aug. 1997), 
http://66.165.94.98/stories/hobblgen0897.html.  The latter figure includes jail, prison, parole, 
probation, and warrants. 
94. BRAMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
95. For example, the overall incarceration rate for the District is 1.8%, while in Baltimore, 
Maryland, it is 2.1%, and in New Haven, Connecticut, it is 1.7%.  Id. at 235 n.3. 
96. Ed Marciniak, Standing Room Only: What to Do About Prison Overcrowding, 
COMMONWEAL, Jan. 25, 2002, at 10, 10. 
97. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000). 
98. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2005). 
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academic were it not for the fact that blacks accounted for 80% of offenders 
sentenced for possession and sale of crack cocaine but only 30% of those 
sentenced for possession and sale of powder cocaine.99 
To be sure, crack cocaine is socially destructive.  The literature on the 
effects of crack cocaine prevalence is vast and consistent in this regard.  
Those addicted to drugs are more likely to engage in criminal activities,100 
and the burdens of criminality fall disproportionately on black 
communities.101  Crack cocaine is highly addictive, posing a significant 
economic burden on those who use it and their families.102  The material 
costs are great, as addicts resort to criminal activities in support of their 
addiction.103  There are also emotional and psychological costs to the victims 
of these crimes, including the families of those who are addicted, robbed, 
threatened, or murdered.  And there are special costs to the women and 
young men who sell sex for crack or money to buy crack.  Added to these are 
the broader social costs that accompany high rates of criminal activity: the 
dissolution of social trust, the loss of businesses from the neighborhood, and 
the departure of those who have the means to leave.104 
The criminal penalty of extended incarceration also has significant costs 
for non-offenders.  For example, even when controlling for other factors, 
incarceration remains strongly related to lower household income.105  This is 
due in part to the loss of the offender’s income during incarceration (most 
 
99. Blacks constituted 84% of drug offenders convicted of crack offenses in 2000.  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 69 tbl.34 (2000), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table34.pdf. 
100. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 2001: THE DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2000); see HENRICK HARWOOD ET AL., 
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 1992–2002, at xii, IV-7 to -8 (2004), available at 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/economic%5Fcosts/economic_costs.pdf 
(positing a link between drug abuse and criminal activity and demonstrating the costs of each). 
101. COMM. ON THE STATUS OF BLACK AMS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON 
DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 23 (Gerald David Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. 
eds., 1989). 
102. Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery, Burglary, and Homicide 
Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 316, 317–18 (1998). 
103. Id. at 318. 
104. See David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & ECON. 611, 612 (1999) 
(listing implicit psychic and health costs as among the effects of criminal activity); see also COMM. 
ON THE STATUS OF BLACK AMS., supra note 101, at 465 (citing arguments that criminal activity 
deters businesses from locating in the inner city and decreases the neighborhood’s livability). 
105. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: INCARCERATED 
PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 10 (2000) (reporting that 54% of state prisoner parents and 62% of 
state prisoner nonparents earned less than $1,000 personal income in the month before their arrests); 
Darryl K. Brown, Cost–Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 325, 349 (2004) (“High 
imprisonment rates are concentrated in poor communities.  Those elevated rates of incarceration 
thus impose the greatest social costs on communities that are already socially and economically 
marginal.”). 
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offenders are employed prior to arrest),106 but it is also due to the fact that a 
prison term significantly diminishes the prospective earning potential of 
offenders after release.107  There are also direct costs related to the loss of 
child-care and eldercare that offenders provided.  Grandparents, for example, 
are frequently left not only assuming many child-care duties, but reducing 
family funds to support their children’s relationship with their grandchildren 
through expensive collect telephone calls, visits to correctional facilities, and 
so on.108  In this sense, the burdens of incarceration are spread through the 
ties of kinship, imposing a kind of hidden tax on many inner-city black 
families. 
There is also evidence that incarceration has a corrosive effect on family 
structure.109  While a majority of prisoners are parents, a number of studies 
have shown that incarceration increases the likelihood that couples, even 
those with children, will separate.110  High separation rates are related to 
other risks, including increased rates of lifetime sexual partners, which in 
turn have a host of negative consequences.111  And father absence—the most 
obvious result of incarceration—is associated with a range of negative 
outcomes from increased likelihood of physical and sexual abuse for 
 
106. ALLEN BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, 
at 3 (1993), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sospi91.pdf. 
107. See, e.g., Bruce Western et al., Black Economic Progress in the Era of Mass 
Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT 165, 176 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (arguing that offenders 
have greater difficulty finding work after release due to their lack of employment history for the 
period of incarceration). 
108. More subtle than the immediate and direct material effects of incarceration, but perhaps 
more serious, is the cumulative impact they can have on familial wealth across generations.  By 
depleting the savings of offenders’ families, incarceration inhibits capital accumulation and reduces 
the ability of parents to pass wealth on to their children and grandchildren through inheritance and 
gifts.  Incarceration, like crime, acts like a hidden tax, one that is visited disproportionately on poor 
and minority families; while its costs are most directly felt by the adults closest to the incarcerated 
family member, the full effect is eventually felt by the next generation as well.  Id. at 175–77 
(describing possible reasons that the penal system leaves ex-inmates with lower wages and irregular 
employment and arguing that this scheme increases racial inequality between blacks and whites). 
109. See Bruce Western & Sara McLanahan, Fathers Behind Bars: The Impact of Incarceration 
on Family Formation, in FAMILIES, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 309, 322 (Greer Litton Fox & 
Michael L. Benson eds., 2000) (citing evidence that incarceration has “large destabilizing effects” 
on low-income families); see also Robert J. Sampson, Unemployment and Imbalanced Sex Ratios: 
Race-Specific Consequences for Family Structure and Crime, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE 
AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 229, 251 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 1995) 
(arguing that increased incarceration creates imbalanced male–female ratios that leads to disruption 
of the family unit); Mark Testa & Marilyn Krogh, The Effect of Employment on Marriage Among 
Black Males in Inner-City Chicago, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 
59, 89–90 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 1995) (showing data that 
demonstrates that men that have spent time in prison are at a greater risk of premaritally conceiving 
a child). 
110. See, e.g., Western & McLanahan, supra note 109, at 315, 318–20. 
111. See BRAMAN, supra note 2, at 88, 118 (detailing these effects). 
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children112 to earlier onset of sexual activity among girls.113  It is also now 
well established that incarceration without drug treatment—the norm in most 
correctional systems today—prolongs addiction, further draining families of 
capital, straining familial bonds, and distorting community norms.114  When 
over 75% of black men in our nation’s capital can expect to spend some time 
behind bars,115 these are no longer issues that an isolated and aberrant 
fraction of black families face; they speak to the collective impoverishment 
of entire communities and the large-scale disassembly of the black family. 
In light of these harms, egalitarians are right to be concerned.  But what 
can they do? 
B. Existing Egalitarian Responses 
1. Civil Liberties.—One argument is that egalitarians should continue 
in their pursuit of the criminal rights revolution.  David Cole is one 
prominent advocate of this approach.116  As an illustrative example, Cole 
describes the plight of Terrance Bostick, caught with a pound of cocaine in a 
police drug sweep of a Greyhound bus.117  Cole notes that while citizens have 
 
112. Several studies have found the absence of a biological father to be a strong predictor of 
abuse.  See, e.g., Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living with 
Stepparents, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 215, 223–24 (Richard J. 
Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987) (reporting data indicating that children living in households 
with a stepparent and a natural parent experience greater risk of abuse than children living in a two 
natural parent household). 
113. See Bruce Ellis et al., Does Father Absence Place Daughters at Special Risk for Early 
Sexual Activity and Teenage Pregnancy?, 74 CHILD DEV. 801, 801 (2003) (finding that “[g]reater 
exposure to father absence was strongly associated with elevated risk for early sexual activity and 
adolescent pregnancy”). 
114. Donald Braman, Families and the Moral Economy of Incarceration, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
27, 35–37 (Eleanor Hannon Judah & Michael Bryant eds., 2004).  Of course, one of the reasons 
why there is little or no drug treatment available to prisoners is that the increase in the length of 
drug sentences in recent decades has overtaxed the resources of the criminal justice system, despite 
sizeable increases in correctional spending.  See, e.g., John M. Broder, No Hard Time for Prison 
Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, § 4, at 5, available at 2003 WLNR 5236357 (discussing the 
budgetary difficulties many states face due to increased sentences as part of “the get-tough-on-crime 
climate of the past 25 years”).  The costs associated with the influx of prisoners lead to dramatic 
cutbacks in not only drug treatment, but also education, job training, parenting, and other programs 
in prisons.  See, e.g., JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN 
DO ABOUT IT 185 (2001) (reporting that only one in six of the 800,000 inmates with a drug or 
alcohol addiction receives any kind of treatment).  One predictable result of cutbacks in 
rehabilitation programs is that prisons are increasingly less likely to serve the function of specific 
deterrence.  Indeed, despite stiff penalties, across the country recidivism rates have substantially 
increased.  See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 11 (2002) (demonstrating that 
recidivism for drug offenses has increased from 35.3% in 1983 to 47.0% in 1994). 
115. Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 2, at 117, 117. 
116. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999). 
117. See id. at 16 (describing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)). 
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a right to not talk to police and to not consent to searches, they often fail to 
exercise these rights.  For this reason, police target common drug transport 
routes for “sweeps” in which they ask for consent to search for drugs in the 
belongings of passengers, a practice that nets a large number of 
convictions.118  For Cole and other egalitarian supporters of the criminal 
rights revolution this kind of search and seizure is wrongful, and the evidence 
should be excluded from trial.  The fact that such a search was conducted, 
evidence was admitted, and Bostick was convicted speaks volumes about 
how the criminal justice system contributes to the subordination of blacks 
today. 
One need not believe that there is any racial malice involved to follow 
Cole’s logic.  The disparities in arrest and charge rates may well be the result 
of social and economic conditions that cause police to concentrate their 
efforts on inner-city populations.119  Under this theory, police simply find it 
easier to locate drug dealers, infiltrate drug networks, and make drug arrests 
in the inner cities where drugs are often publicly sold and consumed than in 
middle-class white neighborhoods where drugs are sold and consumed in 
private.120  It is not race that makes the difference; it is simply that these non-
racial differences “make extensive drug-law enforcement operations in the 
inner city more likely and, by police standards, more successful.”121 
Moreover, “[b]ecause urban drug dealing is often visible, individual citizens, 
the media, and elected officials more often pressure police to take action 
against drugs in poor urban neighborhoods than in other kinds of 
neighborhoods.”122 
Predictably, then, numerous studies indicate that nationally, charges for 
possession of crack cocaine are brought against blacks far more often than 
they are against whites,123 and that this is so despite the fact that more whites 
have used crack cocaine than blacks.124  Put simply, blacks who use crack 
cocaine are more likely than whites who use the same drug to be charged 
 
118. See id. at 17–22 (explaining how courts do not consider such police procedure to constitute 
an unconstitutional “seizure” because a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the 
encounter; such reasoning gives police the discretion to select targets however they like). 
119. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 107 
(1995). 
120. Id. at 105–06. 
121. Id. at 106. 
122. Id. 
123. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 69 tbl.34 (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/table34.pdf 
(showing 349 cases brought against whites and 4,140 cases brought against blacks for crack cocaine 
possession in 2001). 
124. More than twice as many whites report having used crack, but slightly higher numbers of 
blacks report using crack in the last month.  See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 
1998, at 38–39 (1999), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/popest98.pdf. 
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with and convicted of a drug offense.  This is why Cole and others believe 
that egalitarians should continue to encourage courts to restrain police and 
prosecutors: by driving up the cost of law enforcement in the inner city, on 
this account, courts can reduce the harm of mass-incarceration in vulnerable 
black communities.  In light of the harms of mass-incarceration, Cole argues, 
“the concerns of the 1960s that initially animated the development of 
constitutional criminal procedure—namely, the use of the criminal law to 
subordinate African Americans”—should guide egalitarians toward a 
reassertion of criminal rights, particularly through the increased 
constitutionalization of criminal procedure.125 
The problem with this response, of course, is that it is just as likely to 
backfire today as it was in the 1960s—and backfire in a number of ways.  
First, it is not at all clear that increasing constraints on criminal procedure 
will do more good than harm for the communities egalitarians want to 
protect.  As Bill Stuntz has noted, wherever “courts have raised the cost of 
criminal investigation and prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices 
to reduce those costs.”126 They do this not only by limiting funding for 
criminal defense, but also by expanding criminal liability, both of which 
make it far easier to induce guilty pleas and avoid the bite of procedural 
requirements.  As a result, “underfunding, overcriminalization, and 
oversentencing have increased as criminal procedure has expanded.”127 By 
increasing the discretion of police and prosecutors in this way, egalitarian 
constitutional strategies have actually contributed to the very problems they 
attempt to ameliorate. 
Second, many Americans—even those living in inner-city 
neighborhoods—simply reject the idea that the harms of police enforcement 
outweigh the benefits.  As Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan have noted, the 
greatest advocates of greater police discretion are not white oppressors but 
minority citizens living in crime-ridden communities: “Instead of shunning 
the police, inner-city residents are demanding that police give them the 
protection they have historically been denied.”128 Residents of a public 
 
125. Cole, supra note 16, at 1074. 
126. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 4. 
127. Id. 
128. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 15; see also id. at 19–22; KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 
19.  Meares and Kahan also draw on Ely’s theory of equal protection, suggesting that because black 
communities are now represented in the political process, there is less justification for court 
intervention.  See ELY, supra note 16, at 135–79 (advancing a representation-reinforcing theory of 
equal protection in which judicial review is appropriate only in questions of representation).  
Criminals, of course, are not well represented, and there is a fairly detailed historical account of the 
overtly racist motivation behind the exclusion of criminals from the political process.  See, e.g., 
Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in 
the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1089–95 (showing racist roots of disenfranchisement 
laws).  Still, it is not clear how much of the exclusion today rests on racial animus and how much on 
(non-invidious) antipathy towards criminality. 
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housing project overridden by drug-related gang violence, for example, 
granted police permission to make a series of warrantless searches in their 
housing project to root out drug dealers.  The ACLU sued, successfully 
defending limits on police conduct put in place during the 1960s and 
ironically, Meares and Kahan argue, blocking “efforts by inner-city residents 
to liberate themselves from the destructive effects of crime.”129 It is this form 
of civil-liberties advocacy that has led dedicated egalitarians like Randall 
Kennedy to complain that criminal-rights advocates should pay more 
attention to the pleas of those “who must share space on streets and in 
buildings with crack traffickers.”130 
And third, for the reasons that these commentators raise and others, the 
public is adamantly opposed to the reforms Cole and others support.  
Whether or not most Americans support drug sweeps, the idea of excluding 
the pound of cocaine at trial because the person consented to a search on a 
bus rather than in Bostick’s home or car strikes many of those living in the 
neighborhoods where such drugs are regularly distributed as injurious and 
unjust.131 
But if broader readings of civil liberties do not appear helpful, neither 
do narrower readings.  Imagine that, as Meares and Kahan have advocated, 
antiloitering ordinances were found to be constitutional and those living in 
housing projects were allowed to consent through popular vote to random 
searches of their apartments.  Without some assurance that those arrested will 
face socially constructive sanctions, “order-maintenance policing” might 
well be disorder promoting—not because the police are racist or intent on 
harming disadvantaged families or communities, but because the police have 
little control over what happens after they make an arrest.  It is hard to argue 
that broader police powers will help crime-ridden communities unless one 
has a more detailed conception of the consequences that follow from 
enforcement.  Indeed, variations in each state’s regime of sanctions may 
provide the best explanation for why order-maintenance policing has had 
such variable effects. 
It is not hard to see why so many living in disadvantaged neighborhoods 
resist the expansion of both prison populations and criminal rights.  They are 
trapped between two serious harms, and egalitarians have yet to offer them a 
reasonable alternative. 
2. Court-Based Equal Protection Claims.—Under these conditions, it is 
natural for egalitarian reformers to look to equal protection doctrine for 
assistance.  Historically, the Equal Protection Clause has served as a resource 
 
129. Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 15. 
130. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 375. 
131. This is the case, of course, only if the search was not motivated by illicit intent—for 
example to intentionally target citizens because they are black.  See Bilz, supra note 70. 
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for those committed to protecting against iniquitous legal regimes.  An equal 
protection challenge to the sources of subordination would also be a far more 
direct approach than attempting to achieve egalitarian ends indirectly through 
increasingly libertarian readings of criminal procedure.  The logic of this 
claim, in light of the harms outlined above, is relatively straightforward: By 
constructing a regime of sanctions that is arguably as injurious as the harms it 
addresses, the state is inflicting disproportionate material and status harms on 
blacks similar to those that helped motivate the Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education.132 
Stigma, race, and incarceration are increasingly related in ways that 
elude most discussions of racial bias in the criminal justice system.  There 
are also more subtle harms that bear on this claim.  The very problems that 
mass incarceration exacerbates—from diminished income to undesired single 
parenting to steadily diminishing deterrence—are deeply embedded in 
stereotypes of black families in America.133  These racially constitutive 
aspects of our criminal sanctions—the extent to which our criminal justice 
system continues to create the social construct of race and reinforce our 
understanding of it—are linked to the stigmatization of black Americans in 
general.  Thus, as many black families and communities confront their 
intimate familiarity with incarceration, they also confront a widespread set of 
assumptions about their loved ones and about themselves in the eyes of 
society at large. 
These claims rely on the understanding that a far broader class is 
harmed by lengthy and non-productive detention than the discrete set of 
blacks in violation of narcotics laws.  Were these burdens evenly shared in 
our society, one could argue that the public should be allowed to exercise its 
option to inflict poor policy on itself.134  But the extraordinarily disparate 
impact that our criminal justice policies have on black Americans raises 
serious equal protection concerns—at least within the framework of Brown, 
Griggs, and Swann. 
The objection to this approach is, at this late date, all too familiar: While 
the Court at one time considered the harm inflicted on a protected class when 
assessing the law’s constitutionality,135 it has since abandoned this 
standard.136  Today, the Court looks to intent rather than effect, allowing 
 
132. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
133. See BRAMAN, supra note 2, at 183–87 (describing these effects in greater detail). 
134. See ELY, supra note 16, at 181 (arguing that as long as all groups have access to the 
political process then the Court should not examine the “political choice” of substantive law). 
135. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) (holding 
that facially neutral school districts that continued to harm black students were unconstitutional). 
136. But see Balkin & Siegel, supra note 17, at 2 (arguing that the Court still uses a principle of 
antisubordination, which forces the Court to examine when harm is inflicted upon a protected class).  
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legislatures and government actors to knowingly employ the criminal law in 
a way that criminalizes, impoverishes, and subordinates black Americans, so 
long as they do so with some other purpose in mind.  On this standard, 
litigants must show more than that blacks are disproportionately harmed as a 
class, more even than that the state knowingly inflicted greater harm on 
blacks as a class; they must show that the state took action with the objective 
of harming blacks as a class.137 
As the Court bars racial classifications and demands proof of racial 
animus, while giving an increasingly cold response to concerns about 
subordination, egalitarians have dutifully followed suit.  This is evident in 
both the development of increasingly elaborate methods for discerning racial 
bias,138 in accusations of hidden racial malice, and in many racial conspiracy 
theories.139 
Pursuit of these intent-based strategies in court have met with 
predictable results.  In the most discussed case to date, federal judge Clyde S. 
Cahill initially refused to sentence an eighteen-year-old offender with no 
prior convictions to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years 
imprisonment required under the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 
1988.140  Seeking to map an equal protection claim to the Court’s new intent-
based standard, the judge found the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be, as a 
 
One reason why this standard has been abandoned might be that the Court believes, per Ely, that 
minorities have sufficient access to the political process to justify a lower level of scrutiny.  This is, 
to say the least, debatable.  See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a 
Former Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1015 (2003) (“Although African-
Americans have more political power and representation than they did during the Warren Court 
years, they still do not have the same representation as white voters.”). 
137. This is the standard of equal protection laid out in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and subsequent cases.  Of course, 
the individual version of this also holds: a plaintiff must show that an agent of the state acted with 
racist intent.  Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66. 
138. As Lani Guinier has noted, “For many politicians and policymakers, the remedy for racism 
is simply to stop talking about race.”  LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 19 (1994).  For a tortured attempt at 
detecting racial motive, see Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs 
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611 (2000). 
139. Kennedy expends a great deal of energy investigating and arguing against these theories.  
KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 351–96.  But many continue to argue against him.  See, e.g., Kathleen R. 
Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in America’s Drug War: Hidden Racism Revealed by 
Examining the Hysteria over Crack, 54 ALA. L. REV. 665 (2003).  Conspiracy theories also thrive 
on the obviously disproportionate racial effects.  Of course, the alleged sale of crack cocaine in 
black neighborhoods to support the Contras in Nicaragua by CIA operatives (apparently without 
CIA knowledge) did not help matters.  For a sample of the resulting anger and distrust that the 
alleged crack-Contra-CIA connection brought, see Southern California Voices / A Forum on 
Community Issues; Contras and Crack: Too Many Ruined Lives, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at B7. 
140. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
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matter of fact, the product of “unconscious racism” rather than race-neutral 
reflection, thus satisfying the requirement of discriminatory intent.141 
The judge not only drew a swift reversal from the Eighth Circuit, but a 
painstaking review by Randall Kennedy.  Looking at the Congressional 
Record, Kennedy found not only no hint of racial animus, but that a majority 
of black members of Congress “voted in favor of the law which created the 
100:1 crack–powder differential.”142 Moreover, Kennedy found, black 
members of Congress made persuasive arguments in favor of the 100:1 
disparity.  Some had argued that crack was a special danger because it made 
“cocaine widely available and affordable for abuse among our youth.”143 
Others argued that the lack of severe punishments for cocaine possession was 
fueling a rise in addiction.144 
The distorting effect that the intent-based standard has on the discourse 
of those seeking justice is apparent in this episode.145  Egalitarian advocates 
and judges have been drawn into a framework that forces them to go beyond 
reasonable claims that state policies contribute to the subordination of low-
income and minority populations in practice and to assert that the state is 
acting with the intent of harming blacks.  Strained claims of government 
racism alienate not only legislators and members of the executive branch 
who are the object of such accusations; they also alienate a growing portion 
of the general population who view these strategies as improbable ploys 
made, of all things, to protect criminals in high crime areas.146 
But if the intent-based standard has led some egalitarians astray, it is not 
clear that an effects-based doctrinal standard would help resolve the 
problems we now face.  The same depth of inquiry and reform that was the 
strength of the early civil rights litigation was also its greatest weakness.  
Because it demanded the structural reform of subordination, it was 
thoroughly inquisitive, requiring, on the one hand, painful investigations into 
the social formation of caste-like hierarchies in America and, on the other, 
arduous and often protracted review of factual data and bureaucratic minutiae 
in school organization, employment practices, and local political order. 
Even if egalitarians commanded the authority of the Supreme Court, the 
judiciary would remain ill equipped to enforce an effects-based standard.  As 
 
141. Id. at 797. 
142. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 370. 
143. Id. at 371. 
144. Id. at 372. 
145. The danger of this kind of distortion, the danger of letting “our sometimes timid 
exploration of the boundaries of constitutional justice limit our reflective imagination,” is always 
present.  Sager, Justice, supra note 7, at 441. 
146. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 352 (discussing allegations of racial discrimination in 
statutory minimum sentences and prosecution patterns for crack cocaine violations); Meares & 
Kahan, supra note 3, at 11–22 (citing examples of community frustration caused by civil libertarian 
efforts to invalidate community-supported laws that were enacted to reduce criminal activity). 
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Lawrence Sager has noted, there are a host of institutional constraints that 
prevent courts from adopting standards that give full expression to 
constitutional norms.  The lack of fit between the deeper conception of 
justice embodied in the Constitution and the remedies that courts are capable 
of delivering on their own make it seem fairly natural that policies which 
redress racial subordination be “understood as constitutional—indeed, as 
clearly constitutionally desirable—yet not be treated by the judiciary as 
required by the Constitution.”147 
One important reason for resisting a pursuit of this broader and deeper 
conception of justice through courts is that it risks turning courts into 
political provocateurs.  The Supreme Court, as Bickel infamously but 
accurately described, is simply incapable of achieving the necessary and 
always contingent fit between what is and what ought to be at the level of 
specificity that justice requires.148  When the Court intervenes in too fine a 
detail, it risks provoking resentment and resistance that overwhelm the 
purpose of its intervention.  This, more than any doctrinal revelation about 
the Constitution, is the chief lesson of the Court’s intervention into criminal 
procedure and criminal rights. 
C. Time for a New Strategy 
Surveying the civil rights battlefield today, egalitarians cannot be 
pleased.  We have lost the battle over the terms on which the war for equality 
will be fought, and nowhere have we lost more decisively than in the 
criminal justice system.  It is perhaps the biggest modern blunder egalitarians 
have made, provoking some of the deepest political and practical problems 
we face today.  The constitutionalization of criminal procedure and 
punishment has not only failed to dent the iniquitous enforcement of the law, 
it has led to the withdrawal of desired police protection from those who live 
in communities battered by crime, and, along with a host of other 
contributing influences, it has turned the public against the broader 
egalitarian cause, linking the pursuit of equality with the defense of criminals 
rather than the defense of vulnerable minority communities.  We can do 
better. 
 
147. Sager, Justice, supra note 7, at 411 (suggesting that “a broad gap exists between our 
notions of political justice and the corpus of constitutional case law”). 
148. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 26 (1975) (urging that judges 
“ought never impose an answer on the society merely because it seems prudent and wise to them 
personally, or because they believe that [the solution offered by a political institution] is foolish” 
and arguing further that courts should “move cautiously . . . mindful of the dominant role the 
political institutions are allowed, and always anxious first to invent compromises and 
accommodations before declaring firm and unambiguous principles”). 
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III. An Effective Egalitarianism 
Bearing in mind the many obstacles that face any proposal for change, 
this Part proposes a modest criminal justice reform that can help egalitarians 
achieve their abiding goal of justice for all.  There are three broad 
dimensions to my proposal. 
A. A Focus on Harms to Non-Offenders 
First, egalitarians should shift their focus from the burdens the criminal 
law imposes on criminals, suspects, and defendants, to the collateral harms 
borne by non-criminals in their communities.  This not only has the 
advantage of being far more acceptable to the public at large, it more clearly 
identifies the true nature of the harm to which egalitarians object.  Making 
the reduction of these harms the principal target of egalitarian criminal 
justice reform efforts is necessary to the pragmatic resolution of the new 
American dilemma. 
The values and goals of egalitarian reformers are shared by most 
Americans.  And yet, their proposals appear to run against the grain of public 
sentiment.  While the traditional egalitarian response to this divergence is to 
advocate educating the public, in this instance it does not appear that most 
citizens need educating (indeed it may be reformers who could do with some 
education on this point). 
During the Civil Rights Movement, the state used police power to 
preserve white power.  The push for restraining the racist state to protect 
criminal suspects, defendants, and offenders made sense then, but times have 
changed.  Today, however, the relationship between race and the state’s use 
of its police power is more complicated.  Black Americans are no longer 
without political power, and the interests of the state are now more closely 
aligned with the interests of minority communities—in no small part because 
those communities elect many of their local and state officials.149 
 
149. In our nation’s capital, for example, the mayor, many of the council members, and a 
substantial majority of the police are black.  Again, this matters if the Court is concerned with 
representation reinforcement.  See ELY, supra note 16, at 77–88 (arguing that a representation 
reinforcement approach to judicial review entirely supports the underlying premises of the 
American system of representative democracy).  Not to beat a dead horse here, but in this Article I 
am suggesting, congruent with other theories of popular constitutionalism, that Ely’s theory of the 
judicial role not only explains why courts limit their interpretation of open-ended constitutional 
provisions, but also implies that there is a great deal more to the Constitution itself.  Cf. Michael 
Dorf, Putting the Democracy in Democracy and Distrust: The Coherentist Case for Representation 
Reinforcement 45 (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 04-77, 2004), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=602541 (asserting that, given Ely’s claim “that even the People in their 
capacity as constitution writers, armed with the full legitimacy of a super-majoritarian mandate, 
ought not entrench what they firmly regard as fundamental substantive values,” then “unelected 
judges armed only with ambiguous text adopted in different circumstances ought not interpret that 
text to entrench what a bare majority of them regard as substantive values”). 
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Rather than employing its police power to frustrate egalitarian reform, 
the state is now actively attempting to respond to calls for greater police 
protection in the inner city and addressing the harms that crime imposes on 
its citizens.150  The conflation of the interests of disadvantaged communities 
with the interests of criminal suspects, defendants, and offenders has gone a 
fair distance toward alienating those who suffer the ravages of criminal 
activity.  Answering the cry of unjust punishment from these communities by 
defending criminal actors is worse than incoherent; it forces communities 
into an impossible choice between two unnecessary injustices. 
Instead, egalitarians should shift their focus from the defense of 
criminals, suspects, and defendants to the collateral harms borne by 
noncriminals in their communities.  The central problem is not 
discriminatory policing or prosecutions but rather sanctions that harm rather 
than help the communities where the offenses are committed.  These are 
predictable harms generated by state action, and they burden innocent parties 
in already burdened and disadvantaged communities.  These communities are 
in dire need of advocates—but advocates of disadvantaged communities 
rather than advocates of the libertarian rights-endowed criminals who 
victimize those who live in them. 
B. Re-engaging the Public 
Second, egalitarians need to actively reengage the public.  Egalitarians 
have typically distrusted the public, fearing popular sentiment as potentially 
insensitive to the needs of vulnerable minorities.  But on issues of criminal 
justice, the public is surprisingly sophisticated and sensitive to the needs of 
communities burdened by crime.  Egalitarians can and should leverage public 
support for sanctions that help rather than hurt communities already injured 
by crime.  We are fully capable of moving the public to support the cause of 
justice, but we need to trust and engage the public to do it. 
The shift in attention from criminals to communities described above 
gets the problem of modern inequality right: Social subordination today has 
less to do with over-policing than it does with criminal sanctions that harm as 
much as they help.  But it is also effective symbolic politics.  Americans—
both those who live in the inner city and those who do not—overwhelmingly 
support mandatory education, drug treatment, job training, and work 
requirements for convicts.  Indeed, support for these types of socially 
productive sanctions—the kinds of sanctions that would actually benefit the 
communities where criminals are convicted—stands at about 90% in one 
 
150. See generally Kahan & Meares, supra note 17 (examining how major urban centers, in 
responding to citizens’ demands for effective law enforcement, are rediscovering community 
policing and provoking constitutional and procedural challenges from civil libertarian groups). 
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major public opinion poll.151  Yet none of these are the norm in sentencing or 
corrections, and most of these are at the periphery of the egalitarian agenda. 
Harnessing public sentiment in the case of the criminal law is important, 
not only because it can aid egalitarian reform, but also because it is just and 
good.  The criminal law gives expression to our deepest intuitions about right 
and wrong, and the enforcement of criminal sanctions is an act through 
which we imagine the limits of our social bonds with one another.  Public 
frustration with our criminal justice system reflects a deeper anxiety about 
the unraveling of the social fabric itself and the inability of our criminal 
justice system to do anything about it.152  Rather than dismissing the concerns 
of the people, egalitarians should view this as an opportunity for reform. 
C. Getting the Process Right 
Third, egalitarians need to get the process right.  As a pragmatic matter, 
egalitarians should put aside their attempts at unilateral enforcement through 
the courts and pursue their deeper commitment to equality through popular 
reforms.   
Who, if not judges, will protect both vulnerable defendants and 
communities from the potentially capricious use of police power?  Juries, 
although increasingly marginalized in modern jurisprudence, were originally 
cast in precisely this role.153  At the time of our nation’s founding, it was 
 
151. See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN & DENNIS R. LONGMIRE, NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY 
OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (1995) (on file with author) (covering the period between June 6 and June 
26, 1995, and based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 1,005).  I describe 
public demand for accountability-enhancing sanctions in greater detail elsewhere.  See generally 
Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions 
in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006). 
152. This, of course, is not specific to our era.  See, e.g., KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD 
PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 179–80 (1966) (describing the worries over 
crime in Puritan America as the result of shifting definitions of deviance precipitated by broader 
social anxieties rather than as the result of crime itself); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders 
and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (2000) 
(describing a similar phenomenon today). 
153. That is, the jury provides information to the state about popular sentiment through its 
selection of sanctions.  While I focus on the American experience here, it is worth noting that this 
was also true in the eighteenth-century English jurisprudence from which the Framers drew most of 
their own inspiration.  As one prominent historian has noted: 
Only a small fraction of eighteenth-century criminal trials were genuinely contested 
inquiries into guilt or innocence.  In most cases the accused had been caught in the act 
or otherwise possessed no credible defense.  To the extent that trial had a function in 
such cases beyond formalizing the inevitable conclusion of guilt, it was to decide the 
sanction.  These trials were sentencing proceedings.  The main object of the defense 
was to present the jury with a view of the circumstances of the crime and the offender 
that would motivate it to return a verdict within the privilege of clergy, in order to 
reduce the sanction from death to transportation, or to lower the offense from grand to 
petty larceny, which ordinarily reduced the sanction from transportation to whipping. 
John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41 (1983). 
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neither the judiciary nor the legislature that exercised the most sway over 
sentencing, but juries.154  In both civil and criminal trials, juries decided law, 
fact, and quite often sanctions “complicatedly.”155 And while many today 
think of Article III and the Sixth Amendment jury requirements as primarily 
a protection against state corruption, a more careful reading suggests that the 
Framers were concerned about preserving the right of the people to play a 
role in the deeply moral decisions about the fit between conduct and 
sanction.156  It is for precisely this reason that public participation in juries, 
while an important safeguard for defendants against state abuse, was also 
seen as, “more fundamentally, a political institution embodying popular 
sovereignty and republican self-government.”157 Criminal trials are both fact-
finding endeavors and morality plays in which community members 
communicate important information with each other and with state officials. 
Unsurprisingly, then, many of the observations made about juries by the 
Framers and contemporary commentators describe it as the community’s 
check against an errant state or state actor.  As one of the Framers put it, the 
people’s position as jurors “enables them . . . to come forward, in turn, as the 
sentinels and guardians of each other.”158 Juries are, after all, “trials by the 
 
154. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 29 (1994) (“[T]he 
law-finding power of juries meant that the representatives of local communities assembled as jurors 
generally had effective power to control the content of the province’s substantive law.”); JACK N. 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 300 (1997) (“When courts exercised their properly 
judicial . . . functions, the decision-makers were the juries.  The most striking feature of colonial 
justice was the bare modicum of authority that judges actually exercised.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth 
Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 681 (1996) (“No idea was more central to our Bill of 
Rights than the idea of the jury.”). 
155. Amar, supra note 154, at 686; see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on 
Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 299–
300 (2000) (describing the diversity of sentencing arrangements at the founding and the large role 
played by juries in many instances); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 951, 958 (2003) (describing the “myth, perpetrated most recently by critics of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, that English juries had no role in sentencing, and that when the Sixth 
Amendment was adopted, the sentencing system that the Founders intended to incorporate was one 
with a long-standing and monolithic tradition of judge sentencing”).  I should note that this also was 
extended through the nineteenth century, during which “[s]tatutes in as many as half of the 
states . . . granted the criminal jury the power to set the sentence after reaching a guilty verdict in a 
non-capital case.”  Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1373 
(1999); see also Edward A. Linden, Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 969 n.2 
(1967) (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia as jury-sentencing states); Comment, 
Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 400, 405 n.21 (1950) (identifying 
Illinois as a jury-sentencing state). 
156. Amar, supra note 154, at 685–87. 
157. Id. at 684. 
158. Letters from the Federal Farmer IV, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 250 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also Amar, supra note 154, at 684. 
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people themselves,”159 and one of the central purposes of citizen juries is to 
prevent the state from exerting arbitrary and unjust power over citizens 
through the criminal law. 
Jurors are well placed to internalize both the benefits and the costs of 
legal judgments160—costs that are both material and social.  As Akhil Amar 
has noted: “a crime . . . constitutes a moral rupture, a distinct breach of the 
peace of the place where the crime occurred.  A crime is committed not 
merely against the victim, but against the community. . . . [J]udicial 
response . . . requires not merely good factfinding, but moral judgment—
moral judgment by the community via the jury.”161 Indeed, the jury clauses 
(particularly the District Clause) can be read as supporting this assessment by 
insisting that the individuals who determine whether and how the criminal 
law is applied in a trial will, by feature of their geographic proximity, bear 
the consequences of their decision.162 
Juries are at the heart of constitutional protections of both defendants 
and the community against arbitrary state power because they are the 
mechanism by which the public inserts itself into the fundamental workings 
of the state.  Precisely because the criminal law governs the most direct 
application of state control over individual autonomy, the trial is also the site 
where the people demanded the greatest amount of representation in the form 
of direct self-government.  When the people partake in the moral judgment 
necessary to sanction a citizen, they are describing the contours of the moral 
world in which they wish to live—something the state is incapable of doing 
because it lacks immediate access to the relevant information about the social 
meaning and social costs involved. 
Jury nullification, for example, is normally seen as a choice between 
one of two great injustices: that of imposing an unjust sanction and that of 
failing to impose any sanction at all.163  As Paul Butler has put it, 
nullification is the decision to follow “conscience” rather than law.164  But it 
 
159. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 86, 90 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). 
160. The internalization of externalities necessary to efficient choice is an outcome that law and 
regulations maintain as a goal.  See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 143–50 
(1970) (discussing three types of externalities and the inefficiencies they cause). 
161. Amar, supra note 154, at 687. 
162. Of course, pleadings are also affected by the “going rate” established in public trials, so 
the influence of juries is not limited to cases that go to trial. 
163. Compare Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700–01 (1995) (arguing that jury nullification is “justice” based 
where the jury believes that applying the law would lead to an “unjust” conviction), with Andrew D. 
Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 109, 124 (1996) (arguing that jury nullification should occur when juries believe the law 
itself is unjust or when they believe the law is just but do not believe the defendant should be 
punished). 
164. Butler, supra note 163, at 700. 
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can also be seen as a form of signaling by frustrated citizens.165  Members of 
the public, through jury nullification, may be attempting to communicate 
their dissatisfaction with the state’s overuse of incarceration and 
underutilization of drug treatment.166  To be sure, this signaling is costly to 
society and to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in ways that are 
readily apparent to anyone living in a high-crime neighborhood,167 providing 
some indication of just how serious the frustration is. 
Today, this reading of jury rights in conjunction with equality concerns 
is particularly apt in our inner cities, where residents, plagued by crime, are 
also burdened by counter-productive sanctions.  The injustice they see in the 
mass incarceration of their young men and the state’s failure to impose 
requirements of mandatory education, mandatory drug treatment, or 
mandatory job training as part of criminal sanctions is widely lamented.168  
Those who live in neighborhoods where a substantial majority of the men 
will spend time behind bars are intimately aware of the inadequacies of the 
criminal justice system and therefore are all the more capable of making 
informed choices about what kind of sanctions are likely to achieve justice. 
While, generally speaking, the trend in criminal procedure has been to 
prevent noncapital juries from influencing sentencing,169 this need not and 
should not be so.  Precisely because juries are so well positioned to inject 
community concerns into the exercise of state power over offenders, they are 
a logical starting place for repairing the ongoing moral rupture that unjust 
sanctions have brought about.  Today, more than ever, a renewed 
commitment to empowering vulnerable communities through the jury should 
be brought into service of egalitarian concerns.170 
 
165. As Michael Spence demonstrated in his Nobel Prize winning work, well-informed agents 
can sometimes improve their market outcome through costly signaling. See Michael Spence, Job 
Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 358 (1973) (defining “signaling costs” as the costs incurred 
by well-informed agents attempting to inform poorly informed agents).  In the market for sanctions, 
the well-informed agent is the public, the poorly informed agent is the state, and nullification is the 
signal.  Although conducted in other terms, the debate over jury nullification is all about whether, 
all things considered, the signal of jury nullification is efficient. (I should note that the public is only 
well informed when compared with the state.  See supra subpart II(A)). 
166. See Butler, supra note 163, at 717–18 (arguing that rehabilitating drug offenders is no 
longer a purpose of the criminal justice system but rather the system seems to have an 
“antirehabilitative” effect). 
167. See Leipold, supra note 163, at 138 (arguing that nullification in serious drug offense trials 
would send a message that law-abiding citizens should stop complaining and face the fact that they 
will have to continue living with the fear that engulfs their community). 
168. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
169. This is consistent with the broader trend away from “public-regarding” doctrine and 
towards doctrine focused on the individual rights of the defendant.  See generally Meares, supra 
note 10 (describing this trend). 
170. Vikram Amar has described the way that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments work 
together to secure jury participation rights in a way that is close to constitutional protections of 
voting rights.  See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995). 
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How?  The centerpiece of the proposed reforms is a new practice, jury 
polling.  Rather than simply having juries or judges choose from a grid of 
imprisonment terms, as most jury- and judge-centered sentencing regimes 
now do, judges would poll jurors on an array of sentencing options for 
review by the state or federal sentencing commission.  In every popular poll 
and experiment where citizens had the choice, they chose socially 
productive, community- and family-supporting sanctions.171  Moreover, the 
more citizens know about the offender and the offense, the more subtle and 
constructive their sentences become, suggesting that jurors will be 
particularly conscientious.  Egalitarians should harness the decency and good 
sense of the public by forcing judges and legislatures to pay closer attention 
to the concerns of the people at sentencing. 
The goal of leveraging popular sentiment, particularly in high-crime 
communities, would still be marred by unrepresentative juries.  As a number 
of judges and scholars have suggested, peremptory challenges exacerbate this 
problem and should be eliminated altogether.172  Egalitarians have supported 
peremptory challenges on the grounds that a white community may treat 
minorities unfairly.  A more reasonable way to achieve the goal of protecting 
minority defendants would be to look at the source of jury composition.  Just 
as access to the ballot has been severely restricted (mostly to the detriment of 
the minorities and low-income citizens), so too has access to the jury.  Some 
have proposed making jury service mandatory for every citizen one week a 
year.173  Universalizing jury service would help, but would not address the 
financial barriers citizens with meager means—citizens who are also 
disproportionately black and brown—face when confronted with the task of 
jury duty.  We should provide reasonable compensation for jury service, say 
$150 per day.174 
Communities that have suffered generations of economic and social 
marginalization will regularly be confronted with both the burdens and 
benefits of criminality and criminal sanctions.  But egalitarians can draw on 
the law of juries to help work out better solutions to this problem.  And they 
can better align themselves with the interests of the communities they hope 
to empower by shifting the focus from the defendant’s right to a jury trial to 
 
171. See BRAMAN, supra note 2 (reviewing this data). 
172. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)) (“The only 
way to ‘end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury selection process . . . [is] 
to eliminat[e] peremptory challenges entirely.’”) (second alteration in original); see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1183 (1995) 
(arguing that “we must be vigilant to prevent racial and gender discrimination wrapped in the 
inscrutable cloak of the peremptory challenge”). 
173. Amar, supra note 172, at 1178. 
174. In other words, why stop a progressive federalism?  Take it to the district level with the 
feds and the county level in the states. 
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the community’s right to participate in a jury trial.  Getting the problem and 
the process right will allow egalitarians to return to the popular politics that 
animated the Second Reconstruction and allow us to start work on the Third. 
IV. Conclusion 
Throughout this Article I have operated under the assumption—
associated most strongly with the work of Larry Sager, but present in the 
work of many others—that the law has a life outside of the courtroom and 
that its meaning is never fully articulated in doctrine.175  With that 
understanding, my first goal has been to describe a positive and a normative 
account of equality concerns and criminal law.  The positive account 
described the failure of a particular approach, one that was distrustful of the 
people and far too invested in doctrinal battles; the normative part articulated 
a strategy for restoring balance and pragmatic optimism to the promise of 
equality under the law.  Strangely, while attention to the role of popular 
sentiment in the law is now common, there have been relatively few 
pragmatic proposals describing how, precisely, egalitarians can pursue their 
ideals in a popular register. 
The second goal of this Article, then, has been to demonstrate by way of 
example how egalitarians can begin to build the kind of popular strategies 
necessary to the successful pursuit of justice. 
The approach I have taken here also has two parts.  The first involves a 
diagnosis of the split between egalitarian reformers and the public on matters 
of fundamental justice.  In this case, the division was generated in part by 
egalitarians’ defense of criminal rights in the teeth of opposition by the 
communities egalitarians intended to protect.  But it was also generated by a 
disrespect for the people themselves implicit in a court-centered pursuit of 
justice.  To succeed, I argued, egalitarians will need to shift their focus from 
criminal offenders to the vulnerable communities in which they live and 
move beyond distrustful doctrinal remedies to strategies that embrace and 
empower the communities they seek to protect. 
The second part of this object lesson involved developing remedies.  In 
keeping with the substantive commitments of the antisubordination principle, 
I argued, the remedies needed to embrace the thoroughly inquisitive and 
respectful nature of our commitment to equality.  The proposals for reform 
 
175. See Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 7, at 1263 (arguing that since not even “generous 
readings of federal judicial competence” would advocate that federal courts subject all 
governmental activities “against the broad values of liberty and fairness embodied in Constitutional 
provisions,” society is left to “depend heavily upon other governmental actors for the preservation 
of the principles embodied in these constitutional provisions”); Sager, Justice, supra note 7, at 414 
(“[C]onstitutional case law fails to recognize some obvious candidates for inclusion in the 
requirements of political justice.  For these claims of justice to prevail, they must be affirmed by the 
institutions of popular government . . . .”). 
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thus sought to vindicate the ideal of equality under the law by promoting the 
generation of information about the concerns and interests of those in 
disadvantaged communities through meaningful jury participation and 
responsible administrative law. 
The greater inclusion of citizens in the creation, administration, and 
enforcement of the law also happens to be good politics.  No egalitarian 
activist, candidate, judge, or administrator need be abashed in campaigning 
for these reforms.  The final lesson of this study, then, is that by properly 
aligning the mechanisms of democracy with the needs of disadvantaged 
communities, we can promote both at the same time.  That does not make 
achieving egalitarian goals through popular politics easy, but it does make it 
refreshingly possible. 
